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Introduction
The European Union faces evolving environmental, social, health, economic, 
and political challenges, including attaining the UN Sustainable Development 
Goals to which the EU has committed, such as clean water and climate action. 
Trade policy is an important tool for addressing these challenges, as well as a field 
in which the EU enjoys exclusive competence1 and extensive experience. Because 
many of these challenges require innovative scientific and technological solutions, 
it is vital for the EU to consider how trade policy influences science and innovation 
(S&I) and vice versa. Unfortunately, EU policy makers frequently neglect this 
important topic. By reflecting on the interactions between trade and S&I, the EU 
will be better prepared to develop informed and effective strategies to address 
global challenges within the rapidly changing technological and trade landscapes. 
 The risks of ignoring the relationship between trade policy and S&I are 
significant, including the curtailment of technological change and innovation, 
which are fundamental sources of economic growth. Inattention to this relationship 
may also prevent the EU from addressing global challenges directly, such as 
through the liberalization of commerce in innovative “environmental goods.” New 
Author information may be found at the end of the article.  
technologies like 3D printing may be able to address health-related challenges 
in developing countries, in particular by revolutionizing the manufacture of 
prosthetics. However, existing trade barriers and legal uncertainties stemming 
from outdated and limited regulatory frameworks, such as the 1995 General 
Agreement on Trade in Services, may hinder the use and development of such 
technologies.2 
Limited scientific influence on trade policy may also lead to policies and 
regulations that are based on protectionist or other political concerns rather than 
on technical merit. This was the case in 2006 when the European Communities 
lost a dispute within the WTO against the United States, Canada, and Argentina. 
The complaint stemmed from a ban imposed by some European countries on the 
import of certain genetically modified organisms. These restrictive measures were 
taken without producing appropriate science-based risk assessments, as required 
by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on the Application of Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Measures.3  
This article argues that S&I should receive more attention within EU trade 
policy, and vice versa, in order to mitigate these risks and help the EU develop 
solutions to global challenges. In addition to discussing the current neglect in the 
EU between S&I and bilateral and multilateral trade policies, it explores three areas 
that reveal the importance of the trade-S&I relationship: the definition of technical 
standards; protection of intellectual property (IP); and support for science-based 
solutions to global challenges. The article concludes with solutions that support 
and harness the links between trade and S&I to help the EU leverage its trade 
power and achieve objectives beyond simple economic advantage.
EU Strategies: Neglected Relations between S&I and Trade
In 2015, a new EU trade and investment strategy4 was presented by the European 
Commission (EC) to update continental trade policy in the face of emerging global 
economic, social, and political changes. This strategy underlines the importance 
of liberalizing trade in services as well as opening the European market to foreign 
companies and enhanced foreign investment. The strategy is expected to boost 
innovation within EU companies through increased competition and increased 
exchanges of people and information. Additionally, the strategy expresses a need 
to “protect innovation” by enforcing stronger guarantees for intellectual property 
rights (IPRs) within free trade agreements (FTAs) and in the WTO. However, the 
strategy only sketches a partial answer to the question “What can trade policy do 
for S&I?” It does not even attempt to address the inverse proposition, “What can 
S&I do for trade policy?”
Failure to recognize the relationship between S&I and trade is not limited to 
trade-related strategies. EU strategic documents concerning S&I also fall short 
in appropriately addressing trade. A 2012 EC communication, “Enhancing and 
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Focusing EU International Cooperation in Research and Innovation,”5 laid down 
the basis of an EU science diplomacy orientation. This communication mentioned 
trade in a very marginal way, promising coordination with other EU policies in 
order to support foreign policy goals, inter alia with trade. Removal of trade barriers 
in certain (unspecified) sectors was cited briefly as a tool facilitating innovation.6  In 
2014, another fundamental communication, “Research and Innovation as Sources 
of Renewed Growth,” did not even mention the word trade.7 Nor did the term 
appear in a 2015 publication from the EC Directorate-General for Research and 
Innovation (DG RTD), Open Innovation, Open Science, Open to the World.9 
One bright spot is the 2017 report of Research, Innovation, and Science Experts 
(RISE) — an advisory group to the European Commissioner for Research, Science, 
and Innovation — which cites adequate trade policies as an element that can 
facilitate innovation and the spread of new technologies. Unfortunately, this 
document was intended to spur internal debate rather than to actually design 
strategies, and does not express the official views of the EC. While discussing EU 
science diplomacy, the report asks, “how to draw together the scientific resources 
of the EU in support of the EU’s various externally facing policies, such as trade or 
development.”10 
Trade and S&I are mostly treated separately by the relevant services of the EC. 
Of course, DG RTD can participate in inter-service cooperation mechanisms set 
up in the EU policy-making process, such as Inter-Service Groups, to steer and 
help prepare impact assessments of future trade agreements. Additionally, inter-
service consultations are carried out on specific issues during the negotiation 
process by the lead negotiating directorate-general (normally DG Trade).11 
However, a privileged or specific cooperation mechanism between DG Trade and 
DG RTD does not exist when it comes to trade negotiations. Also, broader bilateral 
treaties such as EU Association Agreements often include science and technology 
cooperation deals that fall under the DG RTD but are mostly treated separately 
from trade negotiations.
The relative silence of EU policy documents on the S&I-trade relationship likely 
has two explanations. First, conceptual issues do not enter trade negotiations, 
and are at times taken for granted, such as the impact of IPR protection in 
FTAs on EU research and innovation carried out by the IP-intensive industries, 
universities, and research centers. Second, academia has shown little or no interest 
in conceptualizing this issue at the policy and trade negotiation level.12 This article 
seeks to address these points by providing examples of existing links and mutual 
influences between S&I and trade policy, and making the case for strengthening 
them.
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Example 1: Technical Standards
Technical standards governing the production and exchange of goods and 
services address an expanding array of regulatory, technological, safety, health, 
and environmental issues. These standards cannot be defined by trade negotiators 
alone, often requiring scientific experts to help define them. However, scientific 
evidence is not always the primary factor determining restrictive measures on trade, 
with political and economic factors sometimes overtaking these considerations. 
In certain cases, the independence of science itself can be challenged through the 
use of scientific evidence to support commercial interests. Such efforts often work 
against trade liberalization by invoking health and safety concerns as a guise for 
protectionism. 
One long-standing, and still unresolved, example involves a recent application 
of sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures on food and feed safety, animal 
health, and plant health.13  In 1989, the European Communities banned meat from 
cattle treated with six growth hormones allowed, and commonly used, in the 
United States. The ban was challenged within the WTO, in what was known as the 
“beef hormones” case. 
During a WTO dispute settlement, the panel overseeing a case will typically 
consult scientific experts to clarify whether protection measures are justified by 
solid evidence. The WTO states that SPS measures should be “based on scientific 
principles and...not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence.”14  When the 
scientific evidence is judged insufficient, the SPS Agreement Appellate Body tends 
to rule against such provisions, restating the centrality of this principle.15 In this 
case, the scientific experts judged that some of the key studies brought forward by 
the European Communities were too generic to be applied to the six hormones. 
They found that the studies referred to “categories” without explaining which 
kinds of hormones fell within them, and also evaluated carcinogenic potential in 
general without reference to the use of hormones for growth promotion or when 
present as residues in food.16 The panel ruled against the EU provisions. 
Following the first EU ban, the United States imposed retaliatory measures and 
finally requested a WTO dispute settlement. The WTO ruled, in 1997, against the 
EU, inter alia for not having produced a proper scientific risk assessment. Several 
scientific studies were commissioned by the EU and were then contested by the 
United States in a “scientific consensus war” that arguably had little to do with 
autonomous scientific research. In reality, it was the EU’s consumer associations’ 
stark opposition to the import of hormone-treated meat, as well as to the use of 
most biotechnological alterations in food production, that was clearly behind the 
EU position. This opposition was heightened by the parallel hysteria over “mad 
cow disease,” as well as other political and economic considerations.17 
Bringing scientific expertise to the forefront of SPS issues, and ensuring that 
scientific advisors are free to judge independently from commercial and political 
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goals, is fundamental to restoring EU credibility as a global commercial player. An 
expert group for SPS relations with non-EU countries supports increased scientific, 
technical, and economic advice during the negotiation and implementation of 
FTAs and other agreements.18 This is an important mechanism since most EU FTAs 
currently support the application of SPS measures set by the WTO SPS Agreement,19 
and referenced by the international standard-setting bodies (e.g., Codex 
Alimentarius Commission, World Organisation for Animal Health, International 
Plant Protection Convention). These FTAs focus primarily on procedural issues, 
interpretation of WTO provisions, and development of mutual recognition with 
third countries.20 Increased use of independent scientific advice will help reform 
the FTA process as well as EU strategies and decision-making mechanisms. The 
core need is to determine “whether the objectives of regulatory measures reflect 
real health and environmental risks, which are adequately supported by available 
scientific data.”21  
Example 2: Intellectual Property Rights
While science influences, and should increasingly guide, certain aspects of trade 
policy, the question remains of what trade policy can do for S&I. One important 
answer involves the protection of IP. Although the relationship between strong 
IP protection and a rise in R&D and innovation varies by sector and country,22 
the EU generally places a high value on IPRs in its internal and external policies. 
Because R&D and innovation are obviously driven by expectations of profit by 
private firms, guarantees that such innovation will be rewarded and incentives 
for innovation are perceived as a key factor. For example, provisions protecting 
patents in EU FTAs are critical for enabling the pharmaceutical sector to create 
innovative medicines.23 
The need to strengthen IP protection abroad, especially in developing countries, 
was identified as a major challenge to safeguard EU innovation and growth by the 
2014 “Strategy for the Protection and Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in 
Third Countries.”24 Weak IPR protections in large emerging markets, and the lack 
of enforcement mechanisms against counterfeiting and piracy, produce significant 
costs for European enterprises operating in a wide range of sectors. Preferential 
trade agreements have been identified as one tool to address this situation, and 
provisions for the protection of IPRs are included in most agreements negotiated 
by the EC with third countries. Recent EU FTAs have integrated chapters on IPRs 
with different scopes. Some have promoted regulatory convergence with the EU 
(e.g., EU neighbors), some have upgraded the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPs) provisions (e.g., Canada, Republic of Korea, Singapore), 
and some have raised minimum international standards (e.g., Central America, 
Colombia, Peru).25 
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The need for IP protection applies not only to emerging markets but also to 
some economies in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), such as Canada. The level of IPR protection in Canada is considerably 
lower than in the EU and was widely perceived by stakeholders as insufficient, 
particularly regarding IPR enforcement. For this reason, the European 
pharmaceutical industry defended the EU-Canada Comprehensive Economic and 
Trade Agreement (CETA) as a chance to “address Canadian measures that are 
problematic for innovative pharmaceutical and biopharmaceutical products” and 
reflect “unfair, discriminatory judicial processes and weaker patent and regulatory 
data protection,” a position used in the sustainability impact assessment supporting 
the negotiations.26 
Consultation with big players in IP-intensive industries is fundamental in 
designing trade agreements, but more still must be done to gauge the effects of 
negotiated IPR provisions on the many stakeholders involved in basic and applied 
research and innovation. A process open to all stakeholders in IP-sensitive sectors 
should accompany the whole policy-making process of trade negotiations. This is 
consistent with EU efforts to improve the transparency of trade talks, which are 
often contested by civil society and public opinion for their secrecy and content. 
The proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) exemplifies 
how an FTA may fail due to lack of consultation on IPR-specific issues. ACTA, 
a multilateral treaty aimed at strict enforcement of IPR, was initiated by the 
United States, the EU and twenty-two of its member states (touching as it did on 
shared competencies), and eight other partners. The treaty was negotiated quietly 
and without extensive consultations, while including only big players like the 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America and major technology 
companies in Silicon Valley. It was perceived publicly to cover many sensitive 
topics related to internet and communication privacy, freedom of expression, and 
access to medicines. After several negotiation documents were leaked, opposition 
from civil society organizations and the public mounted due to the perceptions 
of threat to internet and civil liberties and lack of consultation, peaking in a mass 
protest in early 2012 as the EU and twenty-two member states prepared to sign 
the treaty. As a consequence of the public outcry, some EU member states decided 
not to sign ACTA and the European Parliament rejected it. Those opposing the 
negotiations, including almost a hundred international academics, scientists, 
and ICT experts, signed a joint statement that declared the treaty a threat to 
both civil liberties and innovation, particularly on global challenges like green 
technologies.27 Considering the failure, the European Commission highlighted a 
need for “broader dialogue with stakeholders about the role and importance of IP 
and the impact of IPR infringements” as well as “to ensure that the IP framework 
remains flexible enough to facilitate, rather than obstruct, the capacity for digital 
technology to deliver growth while at the same time stimulating innovation.”28 
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ACTA failed despite progressive adaptations of the initial draft and mitigation of 
some of its measures.
The lesson of ACTA is that trade policies need to be designed in consultation 
with all stakeholders in IP-intensive sectors from the very beginning. This 
involvement is particularly important for carrying out the studies and assessments 
needed during FTA negotiations. Up to four types of assessment reports may 
accompany negotiations, attached to different phases of the policy cycle, starting 
with an impact assessment and a broader sustainability impact assessment. 
Industrial actors, the ultimate beneficiaries of EU FTAs, are extensively consulted 
during trade negotiations. Scientists and researchers traditionally play a minor role, 
representing a small portion of the stakeholders consulted in the drafting of impact 
assessment reports. Universities and research centers are often commissioned 
to draft these reports because of their expertise. Here, however, they engage in 
technical assessments, and do not represent the views of the higher education or 
research sectors. Also, EU science and technology cooperation with third countries 
is treated separately from trade negotiations, with little interaction between the 
two dimensions. To address these shortcomings, a broader involvement of actors 
dealing with scientific research and innovation, also outside the industry, should 
be sought in the design of trade policy.
Example 3: Global Challenges
The need for innovative technological solutions to global challenges (e.g., energy, 
environment, health, water, and food management) can drive liberalization of trade 
terms for certain products delivered by EU companies to developed as well as 
developing countries and vice-versa. For example, liberalization for environmental 
goods and services is increasingly pursued through EU preferential trade 
agreements.29 Most recent EU FTAs address various issues related to sustainable 
development and support innovative solutions in this regard. Some of these 
agreements, like those with Singapore and Vietnam, have a specific chapter on 
non-tariff barriers to trade and investment in renewable energy generation, with 
the aim of promoting green energy sources.30 IPRs, it is worth noting, also have a 
role to play in addressing these challenges. In this respect, stronger IPRs provide 
incentives that are “crucial to promote investment in green technologies” and 
provide “opportunities for right holders as well as for recipients.”31 
For trade policy to contribute in this area, scientific and technical advice 
must be enlisted to guide decision making. An example of disregard for this 
principle occurred at the 2014 launch of negotiations for an Environmental Goods 
Agreement (EGA) between the EU and sixteen other WTO members, including 
Canada, China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. The agreement was 
aimed at liberalizing trade and removing tariff barriers to a list of products that 
protect the environment and fight climate change. These products should help 
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clean the air and water, manage waste, boost energy efficiency, and generate 
renewable energy, and could be traded with other WTO members through the 
“most favored nation” principle. Unfortunately, negotiations for the EGA faltered 
in 2016, primarily because participants could not agree on the scientific definition 
of an “environmental good.” Instead of working in close cooperation with the 
S&I community to define indicators for environmental impact and create a list of 
products on this basis, negotiations became progressively politicized. The selection 
of environmental goods became a struggle among developed economies to foster 
the interest of their high-tech sectors, making the EGA an “inherently treacherous 
puzzle of politics and customs classifications.”32 A better, evidence-informed 
solution might have entailed creating a permanent scientific advisory body to help 
list, delist, and revise green items during implementation of the agreement.33 Such 
a “living list” could have been adapted to meet the fast scientific and technological 
change in the field. 
Conclusions and Next Steps
The EU is committed to addressing complex global issues faced by the 
developed and developing world alike, including environmental, social, health, 
economic, and political challenges. Many of these challenges require innovative 
scientific and technical solutions. S&I is key to the development and distribution of 
marketable solutions to these issues, and also drives long-term economic growth. 
Unfortunately, EU policy makers have not considered the relationship between S&I 
and trade policy, or else have addressed it in a fragmented way. Part of the problem 
is that cooperation between DG Trade and DG RTD has so far been organized on 
an ad hoc basis. A more structured, strategic approach is needed to ensure that 
S&I and trade are properly linked. Additionally, the recent failure of multilateral 
trade agreements, signaled by the breakdown of the Doha Round negotiations in 
2008, means that any trade-related solutions to these challenges will need to be 
addressed through preferential trade deals in the near term.
A specific strategy for mutual engagement should be defined by DG Trade and 
DG RTD that promotes deeper cooperation between their services and includes 
increased consultation with external S&I stakeholders on trade issues. In 2014, the 
two DGs began reflecting on how to exploit synergies between trade policy and 
research in the context of negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership (TTIP). This dialogue was put on hold, however, and a strategy for 
mutual engagement is still missing. A future strategy could be designed in the 
context of the European Economic Diplomacy Strategy, launched by EU External 
Action Service and the EC to ensure policy coordination among several DGs, 
member states, and other actors involved in the EU’s external economic relations. 
Alternatively, a specific Trade-RTD inter-service group could be tasked with 
defining the strategy. 
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 Involving scientific expertise in trade negotiations will lead to improved policy 
solutions. It will also allow advisors on future innovative products to provide 
DG Trade with a long-term view of how certain sectors could develop. Impact 
assessments, reports on trade negotiations, and stakeholder consultations should 
include advice from scientific experts in all fields relevant to a given issue, not only, 
as implied already, from the R&D departments of IP-intensive industries. 
Additionally, EU science and technology cooperation with third countries, 
which is now carried out separately by DG RTD, needs to be better integrated into 
trade negotiations in two ways. First, the definition of common technical standards 
in fields like SPS requires cooperation on scientific issues. Second, as suggested by 
the 2014 strategy for the protection of IPRs in third countries, scientific cooperation 
with the EU, and access to EU funding programs for S&I, could be used as a 
negotiation tool to pursue trade policy goals.34 DG Trade already participates in 
a number of bilateral dialogues held by DG RTD with third countries to raise 
trade-related issues, such as IPRs. Still needed, however, are a more structured 
mechanism for inter-service cooperation and an overall strategy.
Looking beyond the technical aspects of trade policy, S&I is even less a part 
of strategic approaches and decision-making processes linked to trade. The 
involvement of scientific advice during the policy-making process has received 
substantial attention from the Juncker Commission, in office since November 
2014, which promoted the establishment of a Scientific Advice Mechanism and 
the development of public reflections for a reformed relationship between science 
and policy making.35 Trade policy was given little attention within this debate, 
however, which must change in the future. Most important, existing and future 
mechanisms for scientific and technical consultation must be accompanied by a 
change in political culture. By acknowledging the value of science over shortsighted 
economic interests and short-term political concerns, the EU may begin to fully 
address the global challenges to which it has committed. These reflections should 
be included in the EU’s next trade and investment strategy. 
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